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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
By virtue of this analysis the state is able to determine the suit-
ability of its employees, yet the individual is protected in his
fundamental rights inasmuch as they may not be unreasonably
impaired.
David S. Bell
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION -
ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATING USE TAX ON PROPERTY
MANUFACTURED BY USER
Plaintiff manufactured certain oil well service units in Okla-
homa and shipped the finished units to Louisiana for use in his
business. He then paid the Louisiana use tax1 on them based
on the cost of the materials used in their manufacture.2 The
Louisiana Collector of Revenue assessed a deficiency for failure
to pay the use tax on the value of the goods attributable to labor
and shop overhead. Plaintiff paid the alleged deficiency under
protest, and instituted suit for refund. The trial court rendered
judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, held, reversed. The use tax is measured by the value
of the property at the time it becomes taxable by the state.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 241 La. 67, 127
So.2d 502 (1961).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the com-
merce clause of the Federal Constitutions forbids a state from
using its economic powers to affect transactions occurring be-
yond its borders.4 Thus it has been held that a state sales tax
is limited by the Constitution to transactions occurring within
the taxing state.5 Because of this limitation, states which as-
sessed sales taxes were faced with the problem that residents
made their purchases in neighboring states which imposed no
such taxes. This resulted in a loss of revenue and put local mer-
1. LA. R.S. 47:301-318 (1950).
2. The plaintiff was exempted from paying the Oklahoma sales tax because
he manufactured for export. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1251d (1951).
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
4. See Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935). Cf. Welton v. Missouri, 91
U.S. 275 (1875).
5. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) : "[A] tax on an
interstate sale . . . involves an assumption of power by a State which the Com-
merce Clause was meant to end." See Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340
(1954) ; McGoldriok v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
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chants at a competitive disadvantage. To meet this problems
many states enacted the compensating use tax.7
The compensating use tax is employed in conjunction with
the sales tax to reach, indirectly, transactions occurring outside
the state by taxing property brought into the state for use.8 In
theory, it is a tax on the exercise of any right or power over
tangible personal property incident to its ownership within the
taxing state.9 Property subject to a state sales tax is exempted
from use tax.10 Thus the use tax affects only property brought
into the state from interstate commerce. The rate of the com-
pensating use tax is the same as that of the sales tax and a
credit against the use tax is allowed for a sales tax paid in
another state.1
The constitutionality of the compensating use tax was upheld
by the United States Supreme Court in Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co.12 In rejecting the contention that the use tax was
levied directly on interstate commerce, the court reasoned that
"use" is an aspect of property and that states can separate the
various aspects of property and tax them individually. The com-
pensating use tax does not offend the commerce clause when
6. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) ; Chrysler Corp. v.
New Orleans, 238 La. 123, 114 So.2d 579 (1959) ; Rodi & Miller, Revenue and
Taxation in Louisiana, 25 WEST'S LSA xxix, xliii (1950): "The use tax is
complementary to a sales tax .... The purpose of the levy is to equalize the tax
burden when tangible personal property is purchased outside the state and imported
in the state for use. It places local merchants in a competitive position."
7. Kust & Sale, State Taxation of Interstate Sales, 46 VA. L. REv. 1290, n. 2
(1960) lists 34 states which have the compensating use tax in connection with its
sales tax: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio,' Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
8. For a full discussion of the use tax and all of its ramifications, see
HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 131 (1953); Greener,
The Use Tax: Its Relation to the Sales Tax, 9 VAND. L. Rxv. 349 (1956).
9. LA. R.S. 47:301(18) (1950). See Comment, 25 Mo. L. REv. 188 (1960).
10. While there is language in LA. R.S. 47:301-318 (1950) which might be
interpreted to mean that the use tax applies to all users, no instance has arisen
where it has 'been applied to one who manufactures goods within this state and
uses them, and it seems to have been implied in the instant case that such a person
would not pay the use tax.
11. Id. 47:305. The use tax has generally been characterized as an excise
tax. Mouledoux v. Maestri, 197 La. 525, 2 So.2d 11 (1941). See Brandtgen and
Kluge v. Fincher, 44 Cal. App.2d 939, 111 P.2d 979 (1941).
12. 300 U.S. 577 (1937) ; Notes, 1 MD. L. REV. 263 (1937), 35 MicH. L. REV.
1385 (1937). The State of Washington, in conjunction with its sales tax, levied
a compensating use tax of 2% on the purchase price of goods for the privilege of
using within the state any article purchased out-of-state by the user. The plain-
tiff, a contractor, bought goods outside of Washington, brought them to that state,
and was assessed the use tax.
1962]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII
levied on the use and enjoyment of property which has left in-
terstate commerce and come to rest in the taxing state, provided
that the tax is non-discriminatory.1 3 Justice Cardozo suggested
that the compensating use tax is not discriminatory where "the
stranger from afar is subject to no greater burdens as a conse-
quence of ownership than the dweller within the gates."'14 None
of the cases following Henneford5 has attempted to state the
test of discrimination more precisely. 6
In the present case' 7 the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned
that the incidence of the sales tax is on the purchase, while the
incidence of the use tax necessarily is on the first use of the
property in the state.' 8 At the incidence of taxation, then, the
purchaser or the user is required to pay two percent of the
item's value. Since the sales tax and the use tax both rest on
the person who will eventually "use" the item all users, whether
they pay sales tax or use tax, are subject to the same rate of
tax on the value of the property.
It is arguable, however, that in applying the test of discrim-
ination at the incidence of taxation, the court has deviated from
the spirit of the Henneford case and its successors. In those
13. Subsequent decisions of the Court regarding the incidence of taxation have
broadened the jurisdiction of the state to apply the use tax, holding that when
the goods have ceased to move in interstate commerce, and are used, stored, or
consumed in the state for a time, they become subject to the state's taxing power.
Pacific Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939) (applied to storage of telephone
equipment for use on telephone lines) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S.
167 (1939) (use tax applied to storage of parts to be used on an interstate
railroad).
14. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 584 (1937).
15. United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958) ; General Trading Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) ; Nelson v. Montgomery Ward, 312
U.S. 373 (1941) ; Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941) ; Pacific
Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939); Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher,
306 U.S. 167 (1939) ; Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62
(1939).
16. Many problems have arisen concerning equality between intrastate and
interstate collectors of the use tax which are beyond the scope of this Note. See
Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) ; Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340
(1940) ; Nelson v. Sears Roebuck Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941) ; Felt and Tarrant
Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
17. The ruling in the instant case was somewhat foreshadowed in the earlier
case of Fontenot v. S.E.W. Oil Corp., 232 La. 1011, 95 So.2d 638 (1957), which
held that the person importing an article into this state must pay the use tax
the same as if it had been sold at retail. For a criticism of the Fontenot case
see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-State and
Local Tawation, 18 LOUISIANA LAw REvIEW 95 (1957).
18. The court also found that the use tax is not levied directly on interstate
commerce but on use after that commerce is at an end. It would appear that due
to the ruling in the Henneford case and its successors this aspect of the opinion
is sound. See Pacific Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939) ; Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) ; Kust & Sale, State Taxation of Interstate
Sales, 46 VA. L. REv. 1290 (1960).
NOTES
cases19 the user needed to purchase goods to perform a task
within the taxing state. He could have chosen to obtain the
goods in the taxing state or in interstate commerce. His choice
was not hampered by the effect of the use tax, since he would
have paid the same tax on the goods whether he purchased in
the taxing state or in commerce. It would appear that this is
the real basis for upholding the compensating use tax, i.e., that
the prospective user was not put at a disadvantage because he
went into interstate commerce to obtain the goods.20
In the instant case the plaintiff chose to manufacture the
goods he needed for a particular task. As a result of the instant
decision, since he chose to manufacture them outside of the state
he was required to pay the use tax on the value of the finished
product. Had he chosen to manufacture in Louisiana, he would
have been required to pay the use tax only on the cost of the
component parts brought into Louisiana for use in the manu-
facture and not on the costs of the labor and shop overhead. It
therefore seems clear that the plaintiff was subjected to a form
of discrimination because he chose to manufacture the goods out
of the state.21 It is submitted that this constitutes a burden on
interstate commerce 22 contrary to the rationale of the Henneford
case and its successors and thus that this application of the
Louisiana use tax is offensive to the commerce clause.
Anthony James Correro III
19. See note 15 supra.
20. See Best and Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 457 (1940) : "The freedom
of commerce which allows the merchants of each state a regional or national
market for their goods is not to be fettered by legislation, the actual effect of
which is to discriminate in favor of intrastate businesses, whatever may be the
ostensible reach of its language."
21. The total use tax for a four-year period paid by Halliburton on the labor
and shop overhead amounted to $30,942.20. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.
v. Reily, 241 La. 67, 71, 127 So.2d 502, 504 (1961). The case is now on appeal
to the United States Supreme Court. Briefs amicus curiae were filed in that
appeal by the following companies: Humble Oil and Refining Co., Chicago
Bridge and Iron Co., Sperry Rand Corp., Thomas Jordan Inc., American Can Co.,
Rossen-Richards Processing Co., and Wate-Kote Co., Ltd. The use tax these
companies allegedly would pay on labor and shop overhead of goods manufactured
out-of-state should the case be affirmed amounted to nearly $200,000.
For a discussion of the use tax and its effect on the maritime operator, see
Marshall, Louisiana Sales and Use Tao Problems of the Maritime Operator, 35
TuL. L. REV. 183 (1960).
22. It will be noted that if the author's standard for determination is applied
an out-of-state purchaser will pay more use tax than an out-of-state manufacturer
of the same item, resulting in a seeming discrimination between the two. However,
it is suggested that a manufacturer and a purchaser are in different classes of
taxpayers for the purposes of use tax.
1962]
